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The California Grand Jury System:
A Review And Suggestions For Reform
A. WELLS PETERSEN*
Suggestions for fundamental reform have recently been directed
at virtually every phase of our judicial process, and the grand jury
system has been no exception. During the current legislative
session Assembly Bill 410 was introduced, proposing compre-
hensive reform of the California grand jury system. Although the
bill failed to advance from committee to the Assembly floor, its
proposed modifications were significant. Among the most dramatic
proposals was the establishment of a bifurcated grand jury-one
jury empaneled for the consideration and issuance of criminal indict-
ments and anolher jury empaneled for the performance of civil
investigatory functions. Herein, the author analyzes the past and
present operation of the grand jury system in California and offers
arguments in support of the major reform proposals which were
embodied in Assembly Bill 410.
The California grand jury system is presently the subject of both
intense criticism and lofty praise. In response to the expression of
these opposing views, the Office of the California Attorney General
instituted a study1 of the grand jury system in California to determine
* A.B., 1950, University of the Pacific; J.D., 1966, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law. Deputy Attorney General, State of California. Since 1971,
the author has been instrumentally involved in the study and evaluation by the Office of
the Attorney General of the California grand jury system. In addition to directing and
coordinating the overall efforts of the study, he has personally conducted numerous
seminars on topics related to grand jury operation and has interviewed hundreds of
grand jurors throughout California.
1. For the purposes of this article, this study will be referred to as Project
Study of the Operation of the California Grand Jury System [hereinafter cited as
Project].
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whether the system is archaic, as some claim, unjustly criticized, as
claimed by others, or whether the system merely needs minor adjustments
in order to bring it in tune with the times. 2  During the course of this
study, judges, district attorneys, and grand jurors from 22 counties
were personally interviewed. In the remainder of California's 58 coun-
ties, views were solicited by writing the same officials. Several public
defenders were also either interviewed or asked to comment by letterA
In evaluating the California grand jury system, it is well to bear
in mind the unique nature and history of this California institution.
In California the grand jury system ftmctions not only as an indicting
body but also as a governmental investigatory body.4 Only seven other
states provide for any investigation of county government by a grand
jury beyond cases alleging willful misconduct by public officialsY Two
of those seven allow only for investigation of specific county offices."
While Alaska allows general investigation and recommendations relat-
ing to "the public welfare," it does not mandate that grand juries
be regularly (or ever) empaneled. 7 Oklahoma allows the grand jury
to report on county offices but provides no methods, procedures, or
funds for carrying out such authorized investigation." Only Califor-
nia9 and Nevada10 mandate that grand juries be empaneled annually
to specifically function as a "watchdog" over county government and,
in addition, to hear evidence to determine whether an indictment
should be returned. The grand juries in all other states," as well as
2. Address by Attorney General Evelle J. Younger, Grand Jurors Association of
Los Angeles County, Dec. 2, 1971; Address by Attorney General Evelle J. Younger,
San MVateo County Association of Grand Jurors, Nov. 15, 1971.
3. Notes concerning these interviews and the written responses are part of the
Project and are on file in the Office of the Attorney General
4. CAL. PEN. CODE §933.
5. ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§75, 77, 82 (1959); ALASKA STAT. §§12.40.030, 12.40.060
(1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§43-907, 43-911 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. §§59-309, 59-310,
59-311, 59-312 (1965); MISS. CODE ANN. §§1781, 1788, 1789 (1956); NEV. REv.
STAT. §§172.175, 172.185 (1969); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§331, 338, 339, 346 (1969).
6. ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§76, 77, 78, 81 (1959); GA. CODE ANN. §§59-309,
59-315 (1965).
7. ALASKA STAT. §12.40.030 (1972).
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §§311-31 (1969).
9. CAL. PEN. CODE §§914.1-939.9.
10. NEV. REV. STAT. §172.175 (1969).
11. The general statutory provisions regarding the functioning of the grand jury
in these 42 states are as follows: Auz. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§101-104 (1972);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§78-6-1 through 78-6-7 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit.
54, §45 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. §§4501-4516 (1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§905.1-
905.16 (1973); HAwAI Ray. STAT. §§609-1 through 609-16 (1968); IDAHO CODE
§§2-501 through 2-508 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, §§1-9 (1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§9-801 through 9-826 (1972); IowA CODE ANN. §§770.1-771.25 (1973); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§43-101 through 43-107 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. §5.02 (Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure) (1972); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 11, §§401-419, art. 12, §§431-444
(1973); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§1251-1260 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 51,
§§1-22 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 277, §§1-14 (1972); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§28-947
through 28-951 (1973); MzNN. STAT. ANN. §§628.41-628.67 (1973); Mo. ANN. STAT.
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the federal grand jury,12 are authorized to carry on indictment functions
only. Additionally, it should be noted that California is relatively
unique in that each of our 58 counties must empanel a grand jury each
year. 3 In 35 states the decision as to whether a grand jury will be
empaneled is left entirely to the discretion of the court.14
Therefore, because most of the nationwide criticism leveled at grand
juries today is aimed at the indictment function,15 we must be careful
to relate criticism and suggestions in California to the overall function
of the grand jury. With this in mind, the examination of the grand
jury system begun by this office in 1971 has resulted in the conclusion
that the system should not be abolished, but rather comprehensively
reformed in order to enhance its intended role in California govern-
ment. The purpose of this article, then, is threefold: (1) to survey
the existing status of the California grand jury system; (2) to highlight
those aspects of the system found to be least efficient in the accomplish-
ment of its goals; and (3) to offer suggestions for a comprehensive
reform of the grand jury system. These suggestions were for the most
part embodied in Assembly Bill 41016 which was considered by the
ANN. §§540.010-540.330 (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§95-1401 through 95-1410
(1973); NEB. REv. STAT. §§29-1401 through 29-1419 (1964); N.HL REv. STAT. ANN.
§§600.1-600.5 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2A:73-1 through 73-7 (1973); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§41-5-1 through 41-5-13 (1972); N.Y. Cu.n PRo. L.Aw §190.90 (McKinney
1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§9-22 through 9-26 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE §§29-10-01
through 29-10-45 (1973); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§2939.01-2939.24 (Page 1973); ORE.
REv. STAT. §§14-132.010 through 14-132.440 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§1351-
1352 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §8-2-34 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. §§38-401
through 38-410 (1962); S.D. COMPnLED LAws ANN. §§23-29-1 through 23-29-16
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§40-1501 through 40-1516 (1972); Tx. CODE CRim.
PRO. ANN. arts. 20.01-20.22 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§77-18-1 through 77-18-7
(1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§5601-5606 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§19.1-147
through 19.1-154 (1973); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§10.28.010-10.28.220 (1972);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§52-2-1 through 52-2-8 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§255.10-
255.26 (1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§7-92 through 7-98 (1971).
12. 28 U.S.C. §1861 (1970).
13. CAL. PEN. CODE §905.
14. Alaska, COlorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. See note 11 supra for citation to grand
jury enabling statutes in these states.
15. Symposium-The Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRim. L. REv. 671 (1972); Julien,
The Grand Jury: Necessary or Decadent?, TRxAL, Jan. 1972, at 15; Judging the Grand
Jury, TrME, Feb. 7, 1972, at 59; Mosk, On Trial: The Ground Rules For Grand
Juries, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 4, 1973, at DC 1, col. 4; Ray, Grand Jury Reform
Supported in County, San Diego Union, Dec. 17, 1972, at B1, col. 5; Grand Juries,
They Are Being Used as a Weapon Against Dissent, Fresno Bee, Dec. 12, 1971, at
El, col. 4; Rubin, How Grand, How Much a Jury?, Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 11,
1971, at 9, col. 1; Bray, Not-So-Grand Juries, Blue-Ribbon Panels are Assailed by
Critics From the Right and Left, Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1;
Cowan, The New Grand Jury, New York Times Magazine, Apr. 29, 1973, at 19.
16. A.B. 410, 1973-74 Regular Session, introduced, Feb. 20, 1973, by Assem-
blyman Z'berg, amended, May 3, 1973, referred from Assembly Committee on Criminal
Justice without further action pursuant to Joint Rule 62(a), June 28, 1973.
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legislature during the current session. The Office of the Attorney
General supported the passage of this bill.
CAuLFORNIA HISTORY
As is the case with most legal institutions, a thorough understanding
of the grand jury requires some minimal consideration of its historical
evolution. The first California Penal Code contained statutes relating
to the grand jury.17  The early grand juries in California were em-
paneled quarterly at the same time trial jurors were drawn. 18 In addi-
tion to considering indictments, these early grand juries conducted au-
dits of county books and investigated local prisons and other similar
matters of community interest. 9
In 1880 statutes were passed which officially expanded the duties
of grand juries to include investigation of county government.20 Mod-
em California grand juries typically devote most of their efforts to
the investigation of county government. They still return indictments, but
some counties rarely act in this capacity2' and one county has not
returned an indictment in ten years.22
The population of California has grown from 92,000 in 1850 to
over twenty million.23 With this growth has come a corresponding
increase in the scope and complexity of grand jury duties. This in-
creased work load is particularly apparent in the county government
investigative aspect of their work. Thus specific changes which would
increase the effectiveness of the grand jury in its watchdog function
are urgently needed.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
In recent months the volume of grand jury criticism has steadily
increased. For example, one recent article has called for the com-
plete abolition of the grand jury in the United States.2  However,
17. See Sacramento County Record Group, Court of Sessions, Minutes (Record)
(September 1861). The Record Group is located at the California State Archives
Building, Sacramento, California.
18. Id.
19. See Sacramento County Record Group, County Grand Jury Reports of Janu-
ary 1851, August 1856, and April 1859.
20. CAL. AiMrD. TO Tm CODES 1880, C. 109, at 43.
21. See 1972 Reports of grand juries from all counties except Alpine, Amador,
Calaveras, Humboldt, Lake, Manin, Modoc, Nevada, San Francisco, San Joaquin,
Solano, Sutter, Tulare, and Yolo. These Reports are on file in the Office of the
Attorney General.
22. See 1962-72 Reports of San Benito County Grand Jury. These reports
are on file at the Office of the Attorney General.
23. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 19th Census of the United States: 1970, Popu-
lation, vol. I, p. 7.
24. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Cim. L.&C. 174 (1973).
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most modem critics do not seek elimination of the grand jury, but
instead propose reforms related to the indictment function. Some of
these suggested reforms coincide with changes which would benefit
the California system, and these are discussed elsewhere in this article.
Others focus on the federal system and suggest reforms already present
in California; still other suggested reforms would seek to transform
the "grand inquest 2 into an adversary proceeding completely incon-
sistent with traditional California concepts.
In California, grand jury indictment proceedings are transcribed,
and a defendant is furnished a transcript.2 6  Therefore, criticism 27 di-
rected at the failure of a particular state or the federal government to
provide a defendant with a copy of any testimony he may have given
before the grand jury is not applicable to California.
Some authors feel the subpoena power of the grand jury should be
restricted.2 8 These critics maintain that the abuse of grand jury sub-
poena power has resulted in the infringement of a witness's first
amendment rights. They argue such infringement occurs by virtue
of the chilling effect grand jury subpoenas have upon the constitu-
tionally protected freedom of association. Perhaps the most consis-
tently suggested reform is that a witness be allowed to have an attorney
present with him when he is testifying before the grand jury.29  Such
a change would, of course, transform the traditional grand jury hearing
into an adversary proceeding.
In 1972 and 1973 the Office of the Attorney General sponsored
legislation 0 designed to engraft by statute changes which would in-
crease confidence in the grand jury and, at the same time, improve
its effectiveness. The major reformation proposals are: (1) to shift
from a single panel to a dual panel concept;3 1 (2) to authorize the
25. Justice Pitney describing the grand jury system in Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
26. CAL. PEN. CODE §§938, 938.1.
27. Comment, Grand Jury Secrecy: Should Witnesses Have Access to Their
Grand Jury Testimony as a Matter of Right?, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 804 (1973); Mosk,
On Trial: The Ground Rules for Grand Juries, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 4, 1973, at
IX 1, col. 4.
28. Cowan, The New Grand Jury, New York Times Magazine, Apr. 29, 1973, at
19; Mosk, On Trial: The Ground Rules for Grand Juries, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 4,
1973, at IX 1, col. 4; Grand Juries, They Are Being Used as a Weapon Against Dissent,
Fresno Bee, Dec. 12, 1971, at El, col. 4.
29. Cowan, The New Grand Jury, New York Times Magazine, Apr. 20, 1973, at
19; Mosk, On Trial: The Ground Rules for Grand Juries, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 4,
1973, at IX 1, col. 4; Julian, The Grand Jury: Necessary or Decadent?, TRIAL, Jan.
1972, at 15; Judging the Grand Jury, TIME, Feb. 7, 1972, at 59.
30. A.B. 1355, 1972 Regular Session; A.B. 410, 1973-74 Regular Session.
31. A.B. 410, §3, 1973-74 Regular Session, as amended May 3, 1973 (proposed
CAL. PEN. CODE §888.1) [hereinafter references to A.B. 410 will be cited as Proposed
CAL. PEN. CODE].
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investigation of city government;32 (3) to increase the efficiency of
the grand jury in its civil investigatory function; 33 (4) to modify some
of the existing provisions relating to secrecy;34 (5) to authorize the
removal of a grand juror for cause;85 and (6) to reorganize and clarify
statutes pertaining to the grand jury.sO
A. Dual Panels
Perhaps the most dramatic statutory change suggested is that of
mandating both a civil and an indictment jury panel. Only the City and
County of San Francisco,37 Los Angeles County,3 8 and Ventura County3 0
are presently empowered to empanel two grand juries.
A change from the present single panel system would be beneficial
for many reasons. Since its inception, the California grand jury has
been a "blue ribbon" panel.40  As a general rule, California grand
jurors have been leading members of the community selected for their
knowledge and community interest. This type of grand juror has
done an excellent job, but his interests lie primarily in the "watchdog"
function.41 However, with the rapid growth in our counties, coupled
with the increased complexity of county government, the blue ribbon
grand juror has not had sufficient time to devote to both indictment
and civil investigatory duties.
In addition, challenges to the grand jury acting in its criminal indict-
ment function are becoming more prevalent.42  This factor presents
two problems. One is the time involved in questioning judges as to
their standards for selection, and the other is money. Edwin L. Mil-
ler, Jr., District Attorney of San Diego County, estimates that it costs
San Diego County $45,000 for each challenge to the grand jury's selec-
tion procedure.
In response to this two-fold problem and the appellate courts'
preference for a randomly selected indicting grand jury,43 populous
32. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §930(c).
33. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §§911.6, 932(a), 937.
34. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §§919, 936.
35. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §905.
36. For example, Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §911.4 clarifies the subpoena power
of the grand jury as presently set forth in CAL. PNt. CODE §939.2.
37. CAL. PEN. CODE §904.6.
38. CAL. PEN. CODE §904.5.
39. CAL. PEN. CODE §904.7.
40. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§895-902, pertaining to the listing and selection of grand
jurors.
41. Interviews with grand jurors and foremen of grand juries which are part of
the Project and are on file in the Office of the Attorney General
42. In re Wells, 20 Cal. App. 3d 640, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971), is among the most
notable of such challenges.
43. Id. at 650-51, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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counties should be required to have two panels with the indictment
panel chosen at random.4" The smaller counties could have a single
panel; but if that panel brings in indictments, it should be required to be
chosen at random.45 The least populous counties could empanel special
panels for indictments when they are needed.46 Three counties in Cali-
fornia-Butte, Merced, and Ventura-now empanel a single, randomly
selected grand jury. Public officials contacted in these counties reported
grand juries selected by this system have been of high quality. Several
other counties select the majority of the grand jury at random but at
the same time also blend in nominees.
47
A civil panel selected under the dual panel concept would be more
apt to take advantage of community expertise in making suggestions for
improving county government. Businessmen would be more amenable to
making themselves available for grand jury duty, and judges would
be less reticent to suggest grand jury duty to members of the business
community since there would not be the massive demand on their time
that is now expected. With more time available, in-depth civil investiga-
tions could be undertaken. This is particularly true in light of the
proposed change authorizing selective audits.48
Interviews with grand jurors revealed that nominated grand jurors
were more interested in the civil than the indictment function of the
grand jury. Thus it is logical to retain the nominated juror system
for the civil function. The bifurcation of functions would also appear
to answer the criticism that the district attorney currently controls the
grand jury even when it acts in its civil function. This is due to the fact
that under the bifurcated system, with respect to civil investigations, the
grand jury would tend to rely more upon other county legal assistance
since the district attorney would not be directly involved.
Not only would dual panels improve the efficiency of the grand
jury in its civil watchdog function, but also in its indictment function.
A grand jury concerned only with indictments would not consider
time spent on criminal investigation as depriving them of time which
should be spent on civil investigation. An indictment panel could
devote itself completely to criminal matters without having its attention
diverted by other pressing concerns. This would also benefit law en-
44. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §§888, 888.1, 895(b).
45. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §§888, 888.2, 895(b).
46. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §§888, 888.3, 895(b).
47. A complete sampling is not available at this time; however, Sacramento and
San Joaquin Counties choose a blended grand jury, and this office is informed that
there are other counties which operate in the same fashion.
48. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §932.
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forcement since a district attorney would be able to present a case
unhampered by the time considerations now present in many counties.
It is further suggested that indictment panels sit for 90 to 180 days,
with provision for longer terms to cover on-going investigations.4 9 Such
a randomly selected, short-term indictment panel would involve more
citizens of the community in this important function of government,
thereby operating to acquaint more people with the criminal problems
present within a county.
A short-term indictment panel also responds to the criticism that
a district attorney, over the period of a year's time, comes to depend
upon a "rubber stamp" grand jury. Investigation by this office has
indicated that only a small proportion of accusations have been
brought by the indictment system. 50 However, such criticism, no mat-
ter how ill-founded, cannot help but erode public confidence in the
grand jury.
Thus a dual system for grand jury panels, with a nominated panel
for civil investigations and a randomly selected panel for criminal mat-
ters, will be more efficient, increase public confidence, and also pro-
vide for the establishment of a true cross section of the community to
stand between the prosecutor and the accused. 5'
B. Investigation of City Government
In today's urban society, the lives of all the citizens of a county
are affected by city government as much, if not more, than by county
government. Furthermore, the activities of city and county govern-
ment frequently overlap. Under the existing statutes, city government
can only be investigated by the grand jury when there is evidence
of misconduct by public officials.
52
Some cities have invited grand jury scrutiny for specific problems.
Such invitations are the exception, and therefore, a clear statutory au-
thorization for such investigations is called for. Even if the grand
jury were only to provide a conduit for meaningful communication
between elements of city and county government, it would benefit all
the citizens of a county. In an effort to correct this problem and
49. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §889.
50. Statistics for 1968-71 disclose that less than 5% of accusations are brought by
indictment as opposed to information. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN CALIFORNIA
COURTS 1971, at 5; FELONY DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN CALIFORNIA COURTS 1970,
at 3; CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1969, at 103.
51. The importance of this principal rationale for the existence of the grand jury
system was recently re-emphasized by Chief Justice Berger in Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 687 n.23 (1972).
52. CAL. PEN. CODE §922. See also, Dummit, Investigatory Powers of Cal-
ifornia Grand Juries, 46 CAL. S.B.L 467 (1971).
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to provide for more efficient use of tax funds throughout a county,
a civil panel should be authorized to investigate city government within
the county.
5 3
C. Improving Watchdog Efficiency
As stated above, a grand jury mandated to conduct an investigation
of county government is faced with monumental time pressures. Dual
panels will alleviate these problems somewhat, but additional changes
to improve the efficiency of the grand jury's watchdog function are
necessary.
Presently, grand juries are required to conduct a complete audit of
county government each year. 54 In practice, grand juries in most
counties simply cannot complete this task in a year. The result is
that certain segments of county government are not audited. There
are presently no provisions for picking up these neglected departments.
Recognizing this pragmatic consideration, there should be a provision
for selective audits.55 However, to protect against any segment of
government not being scrutinized for a number of years, all departments
of a county should be required to be audited and investigated within a
four-year period of time. Such a provision protects against inefficiency
going unnoticed and, at the same time, allows for thorough studies of
those county agencies being audited and investigated in any given year.
Another change which would improve the efficiency of a grand jury
acting in a civil capacity would be a requirement that each county main-
tain a repository for grand jury audit data.5" Grand juries now expend
many hours in developing such data as background for their annual
report. This material is often destroyed, and succeeding grand juries
must often re-till the same soil in developing their report. If past data
were made available, grand juries would obviously be able to produce
more in significantly less time.
Interviews with grand jurors also revealed logistical and practical
problems related to their annual report. Grand jurors are expected
to conduct audits and investigations and then formulate an annual
report." Many of those empaneled have never before written a report,
and of those who have, very few developed reports as extensive as
that called for by a grand jury. In addition, passing on each committee
report by the entire grand jury and then collecting, editing, and publish-
53. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §§930(c), 931.1.
54. CAL. PEN. CODE §925.
55. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §932(a).
56. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §911.6.
57. CAL. PEN. CODE §933.
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ing a potentially formidable document s imposes a great burden on
the available resources of a grand jury.
Accordingly, grand juries should be authorized to file interim re-
ports. The possibility of interim reports being published has the
psychological effect of motivating a committee to develop direction
at an early stage of the proceedings. Allowing such interim reports
to be considered final generates additional benefits-attention would
be drawn to the smaller, but essential, reports which would otherwise
lose significance as merely a miniscule part of the traditionally large year-
end report. Also, as official reports they would appear to carry more
substantial weight than the resolutions now frequently employed by
the grand jury.
The efficiency of a grand jury will also be measurably improved
by the removal of many of the existing "mandatory" requirements,
not complied with now, but which undoubtedly cause grand jury mem-
bers concern when they are informed of their failuire to execute requi-
site duties. Two examples of these requirements are the directives
to investigate the case of every person imprisoned in the county jail
who was not indicted60 and to investigate all transfers of land in the
county where there is the possibility that such land might or should
escheat to the State of California."' Concededly, both are impossible
tasks, and a review of grand jury reports from all counties disclosed
that such tasks are rarely attempted, let alone accomplished.0 2 County
government in California is probably the largest single business in
each county. Therefore, if a grand jury is effectively to conduct
its watchdog function over this business behemoth, substantial pro-
cedural changes are needed to increase the efficiency of the grand
jury.
D. Secrecy
A significant source of criticism of the grand jury centers on the
secrecy surrounding its proceedings and deliberations. As an ancillary
matter, some critics feel the accused should have counsel present dur-
ing his testimony before a grand jury. 3 These are separate problems,
58. See ORANGE CouNTY GRANrD JuRY REPORT (1972).
59. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §937.
60. CAL. PEN. CODE §919(a).
61. CAL. PEN. CODE §920.
62. Reports received from 44 of the 58 California counties for the year 1972
disclose such to be the case. Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Humboldt, Lake, Mantn,
Modoc, Nevada, San Francisco, San Joaquin, Solano, Sutter, Tulare, and Yolo counties
are not included in this survey because the Attorney General's Office did not receive
reports from them for the year 1972.
63. Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CUM. L. REV.
807 (1971).
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and the reform suggested by Assembly Bill 410 offers a solution to
one and an amelioration of the other.
Some secrecy is important and should be retained. This is primar-
ily because in many cases an investigation is conducted, but an indict-
ment is never returned.64 In such instances the person investigated
is protected from unnecessary public disclosure of the details of the
investigation or even of the fact that an investigation had been under-
taken. Furthermore, with the emphasis which courts today place on
a fair trial without undue publicity, the secret grand jury investigation
furnishes a safeguard to prevent the circus atmosphere many bizarre
crimes invite. Preservation of secrecy for this purpose also precludes
consideration of whether notice to a prospective witness of the purpose
and scope of the investigation should be required as has been suggested
at the federal grand jury level.
64a
Secrecy is also important to the watchdog function in that it pro-
vides the proper atmosphere in which to generate uninhibited testimony
from county employees who might otherwise be intimidated by politi-
cal and employment considerations. Intimidation is also a crucial fac-
tor bearing upon testimony derived in criminal investigations relating
to organized crime, narcotics, and juvenile sex offenses.
There are, however, instances when the grand jury is conducting
civil investigations, where the community interest would be better
served by public sessions. Therefore, public sessions should be au-
thorized if the presiding superior court judge, upon application of the
grand jury through its foreman with the concurrence of the Attorney
General or district attorney, determines it to be a proper course. 5
In relation to the second issue, only Arizona allows an accused to
have an attorney present during testimony before the grand jury.66
Apparently the rationale in the remaining states is that since the grand
jury investigation is not an adversary proceeding and there is no judge
presiding (as at a trial), the presence of an attorney for a possible
indictee would present a situation incompatible with a non-adversary
64. Interviews with grand jury foremen throughout the state indicated that this is
not an unusual occurrence. Notes gathered from these interviews are part of the
Project and are on file in the Office of the Attorney General.
64a. H.R. 8461, H.R. 9008, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
65. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE- §936.
66. AMz. REV. STATS. ANN. §§21-412 (1973). Note: an interview with a deputy
county attorney of Maricopa County, Arizona, disclosed that in only one percent of
the cases does a possible indictee appear and that only about half of those choose to
testify rather than invoke the fifth amendment. Some witnesses have also had
their attorney present. When the attorney raises a point requiring judicial de-
termination, the proceedings are recessed and counsel will appear before a judge who
then rules on the matter in controversy.
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proceeding. There would be no impartial arbiter to make a legal
ruling since the foreman is certainly not qualified.
However, recognizing that total secrecy indicates that some matters
brought before a grand jury are not "on the record, '" all statements
before a grand jury during the course of a criminal investigation should
be recorded. 8 With this requirement, a defendant will be assured
that no unrecorded material was presented to the grand jury, and there-
fore, the finding of probable cause to bind him over for trial is based
totally on a record which is available to him.,,
Thus it is recommended that the traditional veil of secrecy sur-
rounding grand jury proceedings should be lifted where logic dictates
the public interest will be better served by doing so.
E. Removal Provisions
No provision presently in the code either authorizes or prevents re-
moval of a grand juror. In light of the fact that under existing law
grand juries are often empaneled for a period in excess of one year,
lack of statutory guidance in this area is particularly dangerous. Certain
activities by a single grand juror, such as the leaking of confidential
information to the news media, are certainly a distracting influence and,
if aggravated enough, can operate to disrupt the orderly deliberations
of the entire panel. Accordingly, it would appear that there should be
a specific statute authorizing removal of a grand juror for cause.70
To prevent any possible abuse of this process, the foreman should
be required to make an affirmative showing of cause to the presiding
judge who would then determine whether removal is called for.
F. Clarification
Because the Penal Code sections relating to grand juries have, for
the past 100 years, been expanded and amended without any overall
reorganization or review directed toward clarification of ambiguities,
the Penal Code sections relating to grand juries should be systematically
reorganized and ambiguities should correspondingly be corrected.
Unfortunately space precludes mention of all such, needed changes,
but some are particularly noteworthy.
There has been some doubt in the past as to whether the grand
jury possesses subpoena power in support of its civil investigatory
67. Bernstein, A Grand furor's Critique of the Jury, Los AnIgeles Times, Feb. 25,
1973, at VI 3, col. 1.
68. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §919.
69. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §919.1.
70. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §905.
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function. Penal Code Section 939.2 does not specifically restrict the
power of subpoena to criminal investigations, but the tenor of the statute
has led some counties to advise their grand juries that subpoenas were
available only in relation to criminal investigations.
The need for civil subpoena power might arise under a wide variety
of circumstances. However, one common problem would be the re-
luctance of a county employee to voluntarily appear before the grand
jury either due to intimidation or fear of retaliation. A subpoena
would undoubtedly facilitate the appearance of many such witnesses
before the grand jury. Therefore, it should be made clear that any
grand jury panel may subpoena witnesses.71  This, of course, in-
cludes both civil and indictment panels, or a single panel which per-
forms both functions.
Also, throughout the 58 counties there exist virtually 58 differ-
ent schemes for computing the expenses and per diem allowances for
active grand jurors. The Office of the Attorney General is cog-
nizant of the fact that each county and each grand jury seem to have
a distinct personality and that these differences contribute significantly
to the vitality and unique character of the California grand jury system.
However, fairness alone would seem to dictate that the computation of ex-
penses, mileage, and per diem should be subject to uniform application
throughout the state.7
CRITICS OF PROPOSED REFORM
It should be noted that these changes have not been proposed with-
out stimulating some very vigorous and vocal opposition. In the
main, this opposition comes from the American Civil Liberties Union
and from the Public Defenders Association.
The American Civil Liberties Union feels that some of the proposed
changes would modify the law to favor law enforcement. It is clear
from testimony before the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee that
the ACLU additionally prefers selection of all grand jurors from some
source other than the voters lists presently employed in California.
While such suggestions certainly merit serious investigation, other needed
reform should not be delayed. Rather, it would seem appropriate
for this organization to present its views through definitive legislative
proposals of its own.
The Public Defenders Association has opposed the reform suggested
herein because it feels such changes in the grand jury system will encour-
71. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §911.4.
72. Proposed CAL. PEN. CODE §891.
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age the district attorney to use the indictment more often because a dual
panel concept would make one panel available for indictments only.73
This opposition overlooks the fact that a randomly selected indictment
grand jury will come from the population at large, a group of individuals
who, as a general rule, can ill afford to take time from their daily
pursuits in order to allow the district attorney to misuse them. Further-
more, such an attitude presupposes a lack of integrity on the part
of district attorneys throughout the State of California. Such an
inference is completely unfounded.
FuTuRE AREAS OF STUDY
The reform suggested by the Office of the Attorney General does
not purport to satisfy all factions. The suggested changes do, however,
provide a foundation for future changes and at the same time provide
for the type of meaningful reform so necessary at the present time.
One area for possible future study relates to the "carryover" con-
cept. The study of the Attorney General has revealed that many grand
jurors feel that they could get started more quickly and accomplish
significantly more in terms of their required duties if a percentage
of the previous grand jury were held over. Opponents of this proposal
point to the fact that those who would be most interested in serving
for an additional period would be those with "axes to grind." Fur-
thermore, the opponents argue, the fresh approach of the new group of
concerned citizens, rather a directed group, provides for a more effective
watchdog function.
Another area for future study concerns the education of those chosen
to be grand jurors. In Southern California, five counties-Los Angeles,
San Diego, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino-send representa-
tives of their grand juries to a quarterly regional meeting to dis-
cuss matters of common concern. This was originated last year
by the foreman of the Orange County Grand Jury and is being contin-
ued this year. Group efforts such as this educate the various jury
members, provide a forum for common concerns, and result in a more
powerful voice to deal with matters affecting an entire region.
Future legislation may well resolve many if not all of these con-
73. It is interesting to note that their opposition is not shared by Norbert Ehren-
freund of Defenders, Inc. Defenders, Inc. is a corporation sponsored by the San
Diego County Bar Association which contracts with the County of San Diego to de-
fend indigents. Mr. Ehrenfruend was also a member of the San Diego County Bar
Association Committee which conducted an extensive study of the grand jury system
in California and made recommendations similar to those proposed in A.B. 410. See
San Diego County Bar Association, Report of the Grand Jury Committee, 9 SAN
DiEGo L. Rnv. 145 (1972).
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cerns. The future may also present new and different problems which
will require solutions. Thus the study of the California Grand Jury
system should be one characterized by continuing efforts. It is essen-
tial that the framework within which the vital functions of the grand
jury are carried out is constantly re-examined to determine its viability
in light of changing circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The changes proposed herein for the California grand jury sys-
tem will substantially meet today's demand for a better and more
efficient grand jury system by providing for dual grand jury panels
(civil and indictment), with the civil panel chosen either by nom-
ination or random selection and the indictment panel chosen en-
tirely at random.
The changes which would authorize a civil panel to investigate city
government, perform selective audits, retain audit data, prepare interim
reports, and free itself from the troublesome burdens imposed by un-
realistic duties mandated by statute are aimed at improving the efficiency
of the grand jury. Lifting the secrecy surrounding the grand jury by
mandating full reporting of criminal investigations and authorizing
public civil sessions when considered proper under the circumstances
would increase public confidence in this venerable body. To prevent a
grand jury from becoming fractionalized and nonproductive, the removal
of a grand juror for cause should be authorized, and ambiguities in grand
jury statutes relating to computation of expenses and the power of a
grand jury to issue subpoenas in civil investigations should be clarified.
These suggested reforms should provide a solution to many pressing
problems currently facing the California grand jury system. The re-
forms, because they include as a central element the regrouping of
code sections pertaining to grand juries, also furnish the statutory
framework for coping with future problems in a more efficient and
common sense manner.

